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Privacy, Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case
ANITA L. ALLEN*
INTRODUCTION
The public is divided over what, if anything, constitutes an acceptable sur
rogate-parenting arrangement. 1 Family planners, adoption professionals, at
torneys, legislators, and judges are debating the moral and legal status of
trading parental rights for cash. The lack of accord is radical. The issues are
seemingly intractable.
Normative debates about surrogacy sometimes depict it as a novel, sui
generis problem of bioethics and contemporary values. But more often, the
debates proceed as a search for agreement about the paradigms of social ex
perience to which surrogacy-related roles and transactions are properly anal
ogized.2 Astonishingly, the proffered analogies equate surrogacy with the
most sacred modes of human association and the most profane. One is asked
to decide: Is the surrogate mother more akin to wet nurse or slave? Is she
entrepreneur or victim? Are the men who purchase surrogacy services fa
thers or mere sperm donors? Are the childless men and women who seek to
overcome the limitations of their anatomies employers or exploiters? Is the
company or lawyer in the business of facilitating surrogacy a true friend of
family life or a parasitic profiteer? Are surrogacy agreements legally binding
commercial contracts or unenforceable commitments?3
The Baby M case has been a dramatic high point of the surrogate-parent* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1974, New College;
M.A. 1976, Ph.D. 1979, University of Michigan; J.D . 1984, Harvard University.
1. [S]urrogate mothering is now practiced when the female partner of a couple is infertile.
A couple contracts with another woman, who agrees to be artifically inseminated with the
husband's semen, to bear the child, and then to relinquish it at birth to be reared by the
couple. The surrogate provides both the ovum and a uterine environment in order to
enable the infertile couple to rear a child of the husband's blood.

Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Con trol of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L.
405, 422 (1983).
In principle, surrogates' collaborators need not be couples and need not be married . The female
seeking the aid of a surrogate need not be sterile, infertile, or disabled. In Baby M, medical dangers
associated with multiple sclerosis were judged too severe by Elizabeth and William Stem to risk
pregnancy. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 337, 52 5 A.2d 112 8, 1139 ( 1 987), a.lf'd in part, rev'd
in part, remanded, 1 09 N.J . 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). Hereinafter , the trial court opinion will be
cited as Baby M, I and the New Jersey Supreme Court opinion as Baby M, II.
2. The utility of the second approach is questionable. See R. UNGER, THE HISTORY OF THE
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 8 (1986) ("Because everything can be defended, nothing
can; the analogy-mongering must be brought to a halt.").
3. At least four states, Louisiana, Nebraska, Indiana, and Kentucky, have enacted legislation
prohibiting the enforcement of surrogacy contracts. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 6, 21,
col. 1. The National Conference of State Legislatures reports that sixteen states have introduced
REV.
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ing phenomenon. The New Jersey Supreme Court dealt commercial surro
gacy a sharp blow when it unanimously reversed Superior Court Judge
Sorkow's startling holding that the constitutional privacy rights of childless
couples demand state validation and specific enforcement of surrogacy agree
ments.4 Judge Sorkow's opinion had championed a state-enforced right to
utilize surrogacy as a constitutionally protected privacy right.5 Writing for
the New Jersey high court, Chief Justice Wilentz countered that a natural
father seeking exclusive custody has no coherent procreative privacy claim
against his child's natural, though surrogate, mother. 6
Does due regard for constitutional privacy mandate legal validation and
enforcement of surrogacy agreements? Even before Baby M, this important
question had been broached-sometimes directly, sometimes obliquely-by a
handful of state courts7 and a flock of law review commentators.8 A few of
these answered as Judge Sorkow answered-inadequately and wrongly in the

bills regulating surrogacy this year and eighteen states have introduced or carried forward bills from
1 9 87 to prohibit surrogacy contracts. /d. at I, col. 6.
4 . Baby M, II, 1 09 N.J. at 4 1 1 , 537 A.2d at 1 234 .
5. Baby M, I, 2 1 7 N.J. Super. at 33 8, 525 A.2d at 1 1 68 .
6. Baby M, II, 1 09 N . J . at 448, 5 3 7 A . 2 d a t 1 254 .
7. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v . Kentucky ex rei. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 2 1 2
(Ky. 1 986) (surrogacy held not to violate Kentucky statute prohibiting buying and selling of ba
bies); In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 132 Misc.2d 972, 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d 8 13 , 8 1 7 (Sur. 1 986)
(surrogacy agreement not expressly prohibited by legislature and therefore allowed despite court's
strong rese rvations); Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 1 69 , 1 74 , 307 N.W.2d 438 , 44 1 ( 1 98 1 ) (state
statute subjecting to court sc rutiny any exchange of consideration in adoption proceedings, other
than court costs, held not to violate constitutional right to privacy, and Michigan statutes prohibit
ing payment to surrogate mothers held constitutionally permissible), cert. denied, 4 5 9 U.S. 1 1 83
( 1 983).
8. See, e.g., Bitner, Womb for Rent: A Call for Pennsylvania Legislation Legalizing and Regulat
ing Surrogate Parenting Agreements, 90 DICK. L. REV. 227, 236-237 ( 1 985) (woman has constitu
tional privacy right to become surrogate); Cohen, Surrogate Mothers: Whose Baby Is It?, 1 0 AM.
J.L. E M ED. 243, 256 ( 1 985) (courts should construe surrogacy contracts as revocable prenatal
agreements allowing natural mother to keep child if she c hooses, and should prohibit commercial
surrogac y contracts); Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Suggestions for
Solutions, 50 TENN. L. REV. 7 1 , 82 ( 1 982) (surrogacy agreement may work an estoppel against
natural mother); Robertson, supra note I, at 420 (judicially de fining and articulating scope of right
to procreative priv acy would set court adrift in largely uncharted waters); Smith and I raola, Sexual
ity, Privacy and the New Biology, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 263, 285 ( 1984) (discussing married and un
married women's rights to artificial insemination); Note, Surrogate Motherhood: the Outer Limits of
Protected Conduct, 4 DET. C.L. REv. 1 13 1 , 1 1 4 1 ( 1 986) [hereinafter Note, Surrogate Motherhood:
the Outer Limits] (criticizing Doe v. Kelley); Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family": A
Proposed Uniform Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73 GEO. L. J . 1 2 83, 1 284 n.5 ( 1 985) [hereinafter Note,
Developing a Concept] (proposing adoption of comprehensive surrogate parenthood statute); Note,
Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable R ights of Surrogate Mothers, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1 936,
1 94 1 -49 ( 1 986) [hereinafter Note , Rumpelstiltskin Revisited] (assessing theoretical justifications for
limiting alienability and rejecting paternalism analysis in favor of theory of centrality to v alues of
personhood).
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affirmative.9 Judge Sorkow's constitutional privacy arguments are problem
atic for three main reasons.
First, and of central concern here, Sorkow's arguments purported to vali
date surrogacy agreements by appeal to the procreative and parental privacy
rights of a childless man or couple. Before adopting the view that these pri
vacy rights entitle childless men or couples to the enforcement of surrogacy
contracts, one must examine the competing constitutional perspective that
the surrogate's procreative and parental privacy rights validate or invalidate
surrogacy agreements. 1 0
This competing perspective undercuts the "breach of contract" rationale
on which Judge Sorkow relied for specifically enforcing irrevocable surro
gacy agreements against recalcitrant surrogate mothers. For, to the extent
that one views privacy rights as fundamental and surrogacy arrangements as
the exercise of a woman's procreative and parental privacy rights, one also
should view a surrogate's power to alienate her privacy rights by contract as
potentially limited. 1 1 Arguably, the state-imposed limitation on alienability
9. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 7; Cohen, supra note 8; Coleman, supra note 8; Note, Surrogate
Motherhood: the Outer Limits, supra note 8.
1 0. See Bitner, supra note 8 , at 2 36-37 (woman has constitutional privacy right to become
surrogate).
1 1 . A central question raised by surrogacy is whether paternalistic (or other) grounds exist for
treating fundamental procreative and parental privacy rights as commercially inalienable; or, i f not,
as alienable subject to limitation by a mother's post-natal right to change her mind. I contend that
while the Baby M courts made constitutional privacy arguments, they paid insufficient attention to
the alienability of such rights.
In the present context, "privacy" refers to an aspect of liberty. In liberal jurisprudence, norms of
individual autonomy or self-determination are commonly said to underlie liberty's (and hence pri
vacy's) value. See Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?,
58 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 44 5, 467-69 ( 1 983) (discussing the alienability of autonomy by positing
hypothetical situation of voluntary slavery). In constitutional law, fundamental liberties including
rights of privacy, protect what the United State Supreme Court deems to be our most important
legally protectable interests.
Whether persons are at liberty to alienate fundamental liberties is a well-recognized conundrum.
Feinberg is one of the only theorists to have addressed this puzzle in the context of constitutional
privacy. See generally id. at 467-83 (discussing the alienability of the autonomous person's right to
self-government); see also Part I I I-B of this article, infra. Feinberg's focus, however, was exceed
ingly general and his examples-voluntary slavery contracts and agreements to forego wealth
unrealistic. Nevertheless, his analysis of competing rationales, including paternalistic rationales, for
limiting the alienability of fundamental rights is helpful.
Interference with the voluntary, self-regarding acts of a competent adult is often described as
immoral paternalism, even when the interference is intended to further some defensible conception
of that person's best interest. See generally J. FEINBERG, HARM FROM SELF ( 1 98 6) (liberal theo
ries of justified paternalism); D. VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION ( 1 98 6) (same).
Thus, paternalistic laws have been criticized as immorai and inconsistent with the liberal conception
of government.
Paternalism interests philosophers chiefly because of the simultaneously appealing and unappeal
ing supposition that the highest regard for humanity requires that individuals be permitted to harm
their own interests, so long as they act voluntarily and do not harm others. Cf Brock, Paternalism
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most consistent with a surrogate's procreative and parental liberty is one that
invalidates her promises to abrogate custody and other parental rights unless
these promises are subject to postnatal revocation. A state-imposed limita
tion of this sort would restrict contractual liberty, while expanding the surro
gate's opportunities for effective reconsideration.
The second problem faced by Judge Sorkow's arguments for the validity of
commercial surrogacy agreements relates to the first. He assumed that pa
rental rights can be alienated prior to conception and childbirth. This as
sumption is shared by others, averse to paternalistic limitations on
alienability, who maintain that among the fundamental privacy rights is a
woman's freedom to hire herself out as a surrogate mother. 1 2 But if any
privacy rights are constitutionally protected, parental privacy rights are.
One cannot rightly conclude that prenatal agreements intending irrevocably
to terminate parental rights are valid without first considering whether
grounds exist for limiting the alienability of constitutional postnatal parental
privacy rights. The highest respect for values of personal security might be
such grounds. 13
Third, the moral criticism engendered by commercial surrogacy casts a
cloud over Judge Sorkow's constitutional privacy arguments. To be sure,
privacy rights are workable and working components of the constitutional
framework. However, privacy jurisprudence cannot be manipulated to ac
commodate every purpose related to reproduction and families. 1 4 To illus
trate with extreme examples, constitutional privacy is no normative
sanctuary for those who abuse children, rape their wives, or beat their
spouses. Similarly, surrogacy inflicts emotional and dignitarian injuries and
inevitably represents the "commodification" of human life and reproduc
tion.15 Like commercial adoption, it turns human infants into a precious
commodity. Whether a parent agrees before or after childbirth to terminate
and Autonomy, 98 ETHICS 5 50 , 5 5 1 ( 1 988) ("there are two central values [au tonomy and individual
well-being] at stake which in hard cases are in conflict and so must be balanced or traded off").
1 2 . !d. For a discussion of restrictions on surrogacy as state paternalism, see generally Note,
R umpelstiltskin Revisited, supra note 8.
1 3 . See Note, R umpelstiltskin Revisited, supra note 8, at 1 94 1 -49 (assessing alternative grou nds
for limiting alienability and rejecting paternalist grou nds in favor of grounds relating to values of
personhood). But see Brock, supra note 1 1 , at 5 6 1 -62 (plausible personhood theories do not reject
paternalism but rather balance paternalism against autonomy).
14. Must opponents of surrogacy " reconcile their arguments with the growing body of law recog
nizing a broad right to privacy and reproductive freedom"? Note, Developing a Concept, supra note
8, at 1 29 5 . Perhaps so. Bu t reconciliation requ ires recognizing that couples may have privacy
rights protecting surrogacy. It does not require concluding that they do have them.
1 5. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1 849, 1 928- 1 9 3 6 ( 1 9 87) (discussing
implications of commodification and market-inalienability and choosing market-inalienability as
"better non-ideal solu tion"); O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy,
65 N .C.L. REv. 1 27, 142 ( 1 986) (surrogate parenting raises commodification and inalienable rights
issues).
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parental rights in exchange for money, in the end a child has been commer
cially disposed and acquired.
Thus, the medical technology that brought commercial surrogacy into
vogue is a step backward from what could be seen as post-Civil War
America's progress toward the decommercialization of human worth. Surro
gacy has other symbolically and materially retrogressive consequences. The
pouring of private resources into surrogacy so that couples may adopt
healthy white babies sends a message of rejection and despair to non-whites
and the handicapped. Moreover, children bred of surrogacy arrangements,
though glad to be alive, may be burdened with extraordinary feelings of in
debtedness to their biological fathers and resentment toward their unknown
natural mothers. All children may be burdened by special fears and insecuri
ties in a society where their parents may obtain money for family necessaries
by giving away newborn siblings.
These concerns provide a basis for opposing surrogacy that is at least as
compelling as the privacy rights thought to support the practice. 1 6 Indeed,
opponents of surrogacy who contend that it is degradation, exploitation,
slavery, baby selling, or racism believe that they have met the challenges
posed by high regard for privacy rights and by liberal intolerance of mere
moralism and paternalism. 1 7
16. A number of surrogacy's troubling consequences are underemphasized because they resist
characterization in the traditional language of negative libertarian rights. Consider, for example, the
consequences enumerated i n the last paragraph, some of which Judge Posner dismisses as merely
"symbolic" objections. See Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B . U . L. REV. 59,
70 ( 1 987) (proposing commercial market in white babies).
1 7 . Surrogac y has implications deeply relevant to womens' lives and economic opportunties. To
start, permissive commercial surrogacy laws conjoined with public support for the practice could b e
expected t o encourage women who need money t o undertake the health and mortality risks of
pregnancy and childbirth.
Judge Sorkow's now moot Baby M opinion stood for empowering women to use their reproduc
tive capacities. But we should be reluctant to create new categories of dead-end employment for
women. Millions of working women have already been shunted off into low paying, low esteem
"female" jobs. Qualitatively better uses can be found for women's considerable resources.
Admittedly, surrogacy is temporary employment which could well serve the short-term needs of
partic ular women. Surrogacy could allow a young woman to finance a year of college, graduate
sc hool, or travel. (Imagine, the au pair of the 1 990s may be a surrogate mother, rather than a mere
babysitter.) It could allow an office worker to finance a sabbatical. It could enable a single mother
to start a nest egg or to cope with the economic consequences of spousal abandonment. It could
enable a housewife to earn the down payment on a family home or to help stave off bankruptcy. It
could provide a woman who did not want to rear a child an opportunity to experience pregnancy
and childbirth.
But opportunities become imperatives in the lives of poor women. If surrogacy is a j ob, women in
need will take it. Husbands, boyfriends, and their own sense of responsibility will inevitably pres
sure poor women into surrogac y. This problem becomes more ac ute as new forms of surrogacy
become widely practic ed. I have in mind the modes of surrogacy that will enable non-white women
to serve as the gestators of white children on behalf of infertile whites. In the face of this prospect,
it could be argued that it is no worse for the upper-middle class to hire poor, minority, and third-
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This essay argues that constitutional privacy prohibits the validation and
enforcement of irrevocable surrogacy agreements. My conviction is two-fold :
1 ) childless men and couples d o not have privacy rights that entitle them t o
state enforcement o f surrogacy agreements; and 2 ) b y contrast, would-be sur
rogate mothers have constitutional privacy rights so strong as to limit their
own capacities for alienating their procreative and traditional parental pre
rogatives. My purpose is to expose the broad parameters of defenses and the
denials of this conviction.
In Part I, I explicate the dueling privacy arguments advanced in the two
New Jersey Baby M opinions. These modest state court opinions point to
ward large questions about the nature and implications of individual privacy
rights under the Constitution. I maintain that Chief Justice Wilentz misdiag
nosed Judge Sorkow's fractured logic, but achieved a practical cure by order
ing remand and partial reversal. Heavily relying on state law, the Chief
Justice avoided direct confrontation with daunting (though basic) jurispru
dential questions about the scope of constitutional privacy and the power of
the individual to exercise and alienate her privacy rights.
In Part II, I consider the implausibility and implications of arguments for
enforcing surrogacy agreements based solely on the constitutional privacy
rights of the childless man or couple. I conclude that the arbitrary and am
biguous attributions of privacy rights that typify recent cases increase the
risk of inadequate, unjust adjudication of surrogacy disputes. In Part III, I
briefly consider the reasons for protecting fundamental privacy rights by im
posing conditions of inalienability.
I.

Two C OU RTS, Two A NALYSES

A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROU N D

In the sense intended here, the expression "privacy" denotes an aspect of
liberty. It refers to freedom from public-that is, governmental-interfer
ence with decisionmaking respecting procreation, families, and other appro
priately private matters. 1 8 The Supreme Court has held that individuals have
a fundamental, constitutional right to this kind of privacy and has relied
upon this right to invalidate a range of state laws deemed to obstruct autonoworld women as highly paid surrogates, than to regularly employ those sa me women at minimum
wage for childcare and housework that take them away from their own families. There is some
thing to this maddening point, yet it falls short of justifying the more risky and personally momen
tous prac tice that carries significant emotional and material implications for others.
1 8 . See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (Constitu
tion embodies promise that certain private spheres of individual liberty will be kept beyond reac h of
government); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 ( 1 977) (one meaning of constitutional privacy
is freedom from government interference).
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mous decisions relating to marriage, 1 9 procreation,20 child rearing,2 1 and ed
ucation.22 The Court has specifi c ally held, however, that fundamental
constitutional privacy rights may yield to compelling state interests.23 More
over, it has occasionally denied constitutional protection to what particular
petitioners have contended also should be unregulated private conduct.24
The Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of surrogate-parenting
agreements. Although many join me in speculating about what the Court
would or should do, precedent does not press inexorably in any specific direc
tion.25 Neither, of course, does the bare text of the constitution provide any
explicit guidance. These are important points. Without guidance from pre
cedent or text, we are faced with the policy question of what human transac
tions a liberal democracy ought to tolerate and forbid in the name of privacy
rights.
B. SOME STATE COURT PRECEDENTS

Before Baby M, a few other state courts had implied or asserted that con1 9 . See Loving v. Virginia, 3 8 8 U.S . I, 12 ( 1 966) (state statutory scheme forbidding interracial
marriages violates due process because freedom to marry is fundamental).
20. See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 43 1 U.S. 678 (1977) (because right to privacy in
proc reational decisions extends to minors, statute prohibiting sale of contraceptives to minors is
unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 4 1 0 U.S. 1 1 3 , ! 54 ( 1 973) (absolute prohibition of abortion violates
right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 3 8 1 U.S. 4 79, 485 (1 965) (state statute forbidding use of
contraceptives violates constitutional right to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 3 1 6 U .S . 5 35 , 5 4 1
(1942) (forced sterilization o f recidivist criminal violates fourteenth amendment). Skinner was de
scribed in Baby M as the most pertinent Supreme Court procreative rights case. See Baby M, II.
1 09 N.J. at 448, 5 3 7 A . 2d at 1 254.
2 1 . See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 , 658 ( 1 972) (state statute presuming unmarried fathers
are unsuitable and neglectful parents held unconstitutional).
22. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 5 1 0, 5 3 5 ( 1 925) (statute requiring education in
public schools violates liberty to choose private education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U .S . 3 90, 399
( 1 92 3 ) (statute forb idding teaching of any foreign language interferes with right of parents and
teacher to choose how to educate children).
23. See Roe v. Wade, 4 1 0 U.S . 1 1 3 ( 1 973) (abortion privacy not absolute because state has legiti
mate, compelling interest in maternal health and unborn life).
24. A recent example of this denial of constitutional protection was Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 1 86 (1 9 8 6), in which the Court held that states abridge no constitutional privacy rights by
criminalizing the consensual sex acts that take place in the bedrooms of adult homosexuals. !d. at
1 92. However, the Court did not reach the issue of whether such c riminalization violates the eighth
amendment. !d. at 1 9 6 n . 8 .
2 5 . See Robertson, supra note I , a t 420 (defining and artic ulating scope of right to procreative
privacy will set Court adrift in largely uncharted waters). Neither predicting what the Court would
do nor prescribing what it ought to do is an easy task in view of the controversies that surround the
derivation of the general privacy right and its application to particular cases. See generally Allen,
Privacy, Private Choice and Social Contract Theory, 5 6 CINCINNATI L. REV. 461 , 46 1 -6 8 ( 1 987).
The problem of predicting what the Court will do is even worse if Martha Minow is correct that the
Court has simply invented "a tradition of constitutional protec tion for the families" out of cases in
which conflicts distinct from the family versus the state were centrally at issue. Minow, We, the
Family: Constitutional R ights and American Families, 74 J. A M . HIST. 959, 982 (1 987).
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stitutional privacy rights compel states to enforce the payment and parental
rights termination provisions of surrogate-parenting agreements. A Michi
gan appeals court has emphasized that its state law leaves individuals free to
enter into noncommercial surrogacy pacts.2 6 The court hinted that this free
dom might be required by constitutional privacy rights.27 The Kentucky
Supreme Court gave legal effect to commercial surrogacy contracts, sug
gesting in dicta that laws that prohibit paid surrogate mothering are uncon
stitutional violations of the procreative privacy rights of men who could not
otherwise beget biologically-related children.28 An ambivalent New York
surrogate's court cited Kentucky's constitutional privacy argument and held
that surrogate-parenting contracts are not void, but voidable "because the
individual state's adoption statutes, which are designed to protect the best
interest of the child, take precedence over any agreement between the
parties. "29
Similarly, in Baby M, Judge Sorkow concluded that, subj ect only to the
court's determination of the best interests of the child, commercial surrogacy
agreements must be enforced pursuant to the constitutional privacy interest
of married couples who are medically unable to have children of their own. 3 0
Sorkow's analysis was unanimously rejected by the New Jersey Supreme
Court, which held that commercial surrogacy agreements are contrary to
public policy and unlawful under state adoption statutes. 3 1 Surrogacy con
tracts cannot eliminate the right a mnther has under New Jersey law to
change her mind about terminating her parental rights.
C.

THE

'
S UPERIOR COURT S OPINION

1 . Sorkow's Privacy Analysis
Judge Sorkow's opinion gave rise to many more uncertainties about the
scope and requirements of constitutional privacy than it answered. The pri
vacy analysis was described as mere "commentary."32 Accordingly, the
26. Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 173, 307 N . W.2d 438, 441 (1981), cert denied, 459 U . S .
11 8 3 (1983). But see Yates v. Keane, Nos. 9758, 5772, slip o p . (Mich. Cir. C t . J a n . 21, 1 9 8 8 )
(surrogacy agreements void a s contrary t o public policy).
27. 106 Mich. App. at 441 , 307 N.W.2d at 173. Plaintiffs' attorneys i n the c ase included Noel
Keane who argued that constitutional privacy rights protect decisions to participate in surrogacy
arrangements. See generally N. KEANE, TH E SURROGATE MoTHER (1981) .
28. Surrogate Parenting Assocs. I nc. v. Kentucky ex rei. Armstrong, 704 S . W.2d 209, 212 (Ky.
1986).
29. In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 1 3 2 Misc. 2d 972, 976-78, 505 N.Y. S . 2d 81 3 , 816 (Sur.
1986).
30. Baby M, I, N.J. Super. at 338, 525 A.2d at 1166.
31. Baby M, II, 109 N.J. at 434-36, 537 A.2d at 1246-47.
32. The primary issue to be determined b y this litigation is what are the best interests of a
child until now called "Baby M". All other concerns raised by counsel constitute com
mentary. That commentary includes the need to determine if a unique arrangement "e-
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principal question before the court was not the privacy rights of the parties
nor the legal status of the surrogacy agreement. Rather, the "primary issue"
was the best interests of the child, Baby M. 33
Judge Sorkow's loose and purportedly superfluous privacy analysis was an
ambitious outline for legitimating commercial surrogacy by analogy to tradi
tional modes of marital procreation. The fragmented analysis was served up
as the central ratio decidendi for his opinion that the surrogate-parenting
agreement between Mary Beth Whitehead and William Stern was "a valid
and enforceable contract pursuant to the laws of New Jersey. "34
The judge reasoned from two strands of case precedent-"fundamental
family rights" developed since Meyer v. Nebraska, 35 along with a general
"right of privacy" fi r st recognized in Griswold v. Connecticu t 3 6 and again in
R oe v. Wade. 37 He argued that these two closely related lines of authority
jointly prohibit states from invading the private sphere of procreative and
family decisionmaking by enacting laws that invalidate commercial surro
gacy contracts. 38 Judge Sorkow thus held that family and procreative pri
vacy rights legitimate both private use of commercial surrogates and public
validation and enforcement of surrogacy agreements.
Sorkow's opinion is confused by references to constitutional prerogatives
tween a man and a woman, unmarried to each other, creates a contract. If so, is the
contract enforceable; and if so, by what criteria, means and manner.

Baby M, I, 2 1 7 N.J. Super. at 3 1 3 , 525 A.2d at 1 1 32.
3 3 . Jd.
34. Jd. at 3 3 8 , 525 A . 2d at 1 1 66. Consistent with the two New Jersey court opinions, Mary Beth
Whitehead-Gould, now divorced and remarried, will b e referred to as "Mary Beth Whitehead" or
"Whitehead . "
3 5 . 2 6 2 U.S. 390, 3 9 9 ( 1 923).
36. 3 8 1 u.s. 479, 485-86 ( 1 965).
37. 4 1 0 U.S. 1 1 3 , 1 52-53 ( 1 973).
3 8. Baby M, I. 217 N.J. Super. at 3 85-87, 525 A . 2d at 1 1 64. States may interfere with fundamental privacy only "upon showing of a compelling interest." !d. at 3 87, 525 A . 2d at 1 1 65. Moreover:
[I]f one has a right to procreate coitally, then one has the right to reproduce non-coitally.
I f it is reproduction that is protected, then the means of reproduction are also to b e pro
tected. The values and interests underlying the creation of a family are the same b y
whatever means obtained. This court holds that the protected means extends t o the use of
surrogates. The contract cannot fail because of the use of a third party . . . . While a state
could . . . and must regulate . . . reproductive contracts, it could not ban or refuse to
enforce such transactions . . . without compelling reason. It might even be argued that
refusal to enforce these contracts and prohibition of money payments would constitute an
u nconstitutional interference with procreative liberty since it would prevent childless
couples from obtaining the means by which to have families . . . .
Legislation or court action that denies the surrogate contract impedes a couple's [four
teenth amend ment] liberty that is otherwise protected. The surrogate who voluntarily
chooses to enter such a contract is deprived of a constitutionally protected right to per
form services.
Jd.

I

at 3 86-87, 525 A . 2d at 1 1 64-65 .
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that either are related to or synonymous with privacy. (He does not tell us
which.) He referred to "a couple's liberty," by which he appears to have
meant their privacy, as an aspect of fourteenth amendment liberty. 39 He also
briefly referred to the surrogate's "right to perform services, " which he also
seems to have suggested has its basis in the fourteenth amendment.40 He
appears to have assumed that this right to perform noncoital procreative
services is part of the fourteenth amendment liberty we call "freedom of con
tract" rather than the liberty we call "privacy. "41
Judge Sorkow also sketched an equal protection analysis that introduced
constitutional values around which his ancillary privacy argument was
shaped. 42 This equal protection of privacy argument was launched from the
observation that sperm donation, a kind of "surrogate fatherhood," is al
ready universally permitted in the United States. He gave no explanation for
his opaque assertion that a ban on female surrogacy denies equal protection
to "the surrogate, whether male or female, and the unborn child. "43
Topping off his privacy and equal protection arguments, Judge Sorkow
concluded that a surrogacy contract that is not contrary to a state's public
policy and that is entered into with "understanding and free will" may be
enforced. 44 He added that specifi c performance is an appropriate remedy
when a breaching surrogate mother refuses to surrender parental rights as
agreed.45 This latter conclusion is strikingly out of line with the common
law doctrine that personal service contracts are not specifically enforceable
an indication of just how weighty the judge believed procreative privacy
rights to be. In deciding to exercise his equitable discretion to specifically
enforce the Whitehead-Stern contract on behalf of Mr. Stern, Judge Sorkow
opined that Mrs. Whitehead "received her fulfillment" but "Mr. Stern did
not," and that " (m]onetary damages cannot possibly compensate the plaintiff
39. !d. at 387, 525 A . 2d at 11 65. Perhaps he intended to say that the fourteenth a mendment
protects freedom of contract in general and the right to privacy (whatever its textual basis) protects
priva cy-related contracts in particula r.
40. !d.
41. Cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (fourteenth amendment limits ability of state
to interfere with employment contracts).
42. A similar equa l protection of privacy argument appeared in Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704
S.W.2d at 212.
4 3. Baby M, I, 217 N.J. Super. at 388, 525 A.2d at 1165.
The "surrogate fa ther" sperm donor is legally recognized in all sta tes. The surrogate
mother is not. If a man may offer the means for procreation then a woman must equa lly
be allowed to do so. To rule otherwise denies equa l protection of law to the childless
couple, the surroga te, whether male or female, and the unborn child.
The reference to the unborn child here is mysterious. Sorkow may have viewed unborn children
as third-party benefi c iaries. See id. at 400, 525 A.2d at 117 1 ( "a third-party beneficiary need not be
in existence . . . at the time of the contracting").
44. !d. at 3 89, 525 A.2d at 1166.
45. !d. at 389, 525 A.2d at 116 5 .
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for the loss of his bargain. "46
2. The Child's Best Interests
Sorkow's conclusion that the Whitehead-Stern surrogacy agreement was a
legally valid, specifically enforceable contract was grounded in constitutional
privacy. However, Baby M's fate was determined by the best interests of the
child, rather than by the logical entailments of constitutional privacy. Judge
Sorkow superimposed this best interests analysis over his privacy analysis to
decide which biological parent should be awarded custody. The judge deter
mined that specific enforcement of the surrogacy contract, otherwise called
for by law and equity, was also in the best interests of Baby M.47
Never was there a real contest between Mrs. Whitehead and Mr. Stern.
Mary Beth Whitehead was severely criticized by the court as "unreliable, . . .
manipulative, impulsive . . . exploitative, . . . [and] untruthful. "48 By con
trast, the Sterns were lauded as cooperative, stable, and rational in the face of
crisis. They were praised as "credible, sincere and truthful people. "49 Afflu
ent, well-educated, competent, and warm, the Sterns presented the promise
of an ideal nuclear family life in which Baby M would have every
advantage. 5 0
The trial court therefore terminated "all parental rights that Mary Beth
Whitehead has or had in the child to be known as Melissa Stern," curiously
pointing back to the supplanted surrogacy agreement as an additional source
of equity for the decision. 5 1 Mr. Stern was awarded sole custody, and the
court's termination of Whitehead's maternal rights meant that, through legal
adoption, Mrs. Stern could expect to replace Whitehead as Melissa's legal
mother. 52
Judge Sorkow viewed his determination of the child's best interests as nec
essary and overriding since any "agreement between parents is inevitably
subservient to the considerations of the best interests of the child."53 One is
thus led to conclude that, in theory, the Whiteheads would have been
awarded custody of Baby M had the facts indicated they would have been
better parents than the Sterns. One is also led to conclude that Mary Beth
46. Jd.
47. !d. a t 394-400, 525 A.2d 1 1 67-72.
48. !d. a t 396-97, 525 A.2J at 1 1 69-70.
49 . Jd. at 39 8, 525 A.2d at 1 170; see also id. at 394-9 8, 525 A.2d at 1 1 67-70 (describing the
Sterns;.
50. Chief Justice Wilentz chastised the trial court for its harsh characterization of Whitehead
and its overemphasis of the Sterns' interest in educa ting the child. Baby M, lJ, 1 09 N.J. at 459, 5 37
A.2d at 1 259.
51. Baby M, I, 2 17 N.J. Super . a t 400, 525 A.2d a t 1 172.
52. !d. a t 398-400, 525 A.2d a t 1 1 67-70.
5 3 . !d. at 39 8, 525 A.2d at 1 17 1 .
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Whitehead would have been awarded joint custody or visitation rights if the
court had determined that the best interests of Baby M would have been
served by access to both of her biological parents.
The overarching logic of his opinion renders Sorkow's privacy analysis and
holdings supererogatory on the facts of Baby M But Sorkow's logic did not
rule out duties for a privacy analysis in principle. His privacy analysis sup
plied a rule, albeit short-lived, that surrogacy agreements are valid in New
Jersey. Thus, under the precedent set by Sorkow's Baby M, a valid surrogacy
contract should provide grounds in law and equity to resolve custody dis
putes in favor of the nonbreaching parent unless the child's best interests
dictate otherwise. 54
In the surrogacy context, however, it is difficult to imagine when a court
following Sorkow's precedent would conclude that both biological parents
are equally fit. Women who become paid surrogates are likely to have con
siderably less in the way of personal and economic resources than the affluent
purchasers of their services. In addition, when a court turns to questions of
character, the biological father, in search of a nuclear family, has a built-in
cultural advantage. Regrettably, under traditional standards of female moral
character, 55 the virtue of the surrogate is automatically thrown into question
when she agrees to bear a child and give it up for cash. Furthermore, a
surrogate's rationality is automatically questioned when she changes her
mind about so momentous a matter as giving birth to a stranger's child and
giving up her parental rights.
D. REEXAMINATION IN THE STATE S UPREME COU RT

The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with Judge Sorkow that awarding
custody of Melissa to the Sterns was in the child's best interests. 56 Agree
ment ended there. The court went on to invalidate the previously validated
Whitehead-Stern surrogacy agreement, 57 restore Mary Beth Whitehead's pa
rental rights, 58 and remand for the purpose of determining the precise extent
of Whitehead's newly established visitation rights. 59 The opinion was strik
ing for its sweeping rejection of commercial surrogacy on a panoply of statu54. Id. at 390, 525 A.2d at 1 1 67.
5 5 . Bearing a child is not what subjects the surrogate's character to attack. I t is that she would
do so outside of a traditional marriage and would command payment. See generally L. BANNER,
WOMEN IN MODERN AMERICA: A BRIEF HISTORY 43, 51-91 (1984) (exploring traditional view
that women are morally superior and ideally suited to life of self-sacrificial marriage and mother
hood); C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFERRENT VoiCE (1982) (suggesting that moral expectations of and for
women differ from those of and for men).
56. Baby M, II. 109 N.J. at 459, 537 A.2d at 1259.
57. Id. at 421-22, 5 3 7 A.2d at 1240.
58. Id. at 447, 537 A.2d at 1 25 3 .
59. Id. a t 466-67, 5 3 7 A.2d a t 1263.
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tory and policy grounds;60 for its efforts to rehabilitate Whitehead's
character;61 and for its strident normative defense of the prerogatives of nat
ural parents and birth mothers.62
1 . State Law and Polley
The basic argument of the supreme court was that private parties cannot
lawfully utilize commercial service contracts to circumvent the requirements
of state law and policy designed to protect the interests of natural parents
and the best interests of children. The court found that the Whitehead-Stem
surrogacy contract conflicted with: "( 1 ) laws prohibiting the use of money in
connection with adoptions; (2) laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or
abandonment before termination of parental rights is ordered or an adoption
is granted; and (3) laws that make surrender of custody and consent to adop
tion revocable in private placement adoptions. "63 The court further found
the surrogacy contract in conflict with state policies that custody should be
based on the best interests of the child rather than on private agreements, 64
and that neither natural parent has parental rights superior to the other.65
The court concluded that, in view of these state statutes and policies, and
because the trial court did not establish that Whitehead was an unfit parent,
appeal to the surrogacy agreement and the child's best interests provided
legaliy insufficient grounds for terminating Whitehead's parental rights.66
The court's decision was at least a partial victory for Whitehead. She did
not get primary custody of her child, but she won visitation rights, much like
the rights of a noncustodial divorced parent. The decision also was a partial
victory for Mr. Stern. He was awarded the privilege of rearing his natural
daughter in his own home. However, Whitehead's reinstatement made Mrs.
Stern a significant loser. Unable to adopt Baby M, she was transformed into
the true "surrogate" mother of a stepdaughter.
2. Constitutional Privacy
The state supreme court rejected both the constitutional privacy and equal
protection of privacy arguments advanced by the lower court to validate sur
rogacy agreements. Unfortunately, however, the court scarcely treated the
60. !d. at 421-22, 423, 425, 429, 434, 435-36, 437, 443-44, 5 3 7 A.2d at 1240, 1 240-41 , 1242, 1 244,
1 246, 1247, 1248, 1250.
61 . Regrettably, the court sought to rehabilitate Whitehead at the expense of Mrs. Stern, whose
motives for deciding against pregnancy were thrown unfairly, and needlessly, into question. See id.
at 456, 5 3 7 A.2d at 1 257-58.
62. !d. at 437, 5 3 7 A.2d. at 1248.
63. !d. at 423, 537 A.2d 1240-4 1 .
64. !d. a t 437, 537 A.2d a t 1248.
65. !d. at 435-36, 5 37 A.2d at 1 247.
66. !d. at 445, 537 A.2d at 1252.
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constitutional issues; i t did little more than acknowledge that the parties had
asserted constitutional privacy and equal protection claims. The court was
apparently confi d ent that New Jersey's limitation on commercial surrogacy
was justified by strong state interests in child welfare and parental liberty. It
seemed not to take seriously the possibility that fundamental constitutional
rights require permissive commercial surrogacy laws and enforcement of ir
revocable surrogacy agreements.
The right to procreate-"the right to have natural children, whether
through sexual intercourse or artificial insemination" 6 7-was identified by
the court as the privacy right that Stern claimed for himself. The court nar
rowly construed this right as the right to be a biological parent, asserting that
"the right of procreation does not extend as far as claimed by the Sterns. "68
The paternal right of procreation did not give rise to a contractually-based
custody award because, the court reasoned, Whitehead could claim procrea
tive rights also:
To assert that Mr. Stern's right of procreation gives him the right to the
custody of Baby M would be to assert that Mrs. Whitehead's right of pro
creation does not give her the right to the custody of Baby M; it would be
to assert that the constitutional right of procreation includes within i t a
constitutionally protected contractual right to destroy someone else's right
of procreation . . . .
There is nothing in our culture . . . or society that even begins to suggest
a fundamental right on the part of a father to the custody of the child as
part of his right to procreate when opposed by the claim of the mother to
the same child.69

Thus, the court portrayed Stern's claim as contradictory. The court was
wrong, however, in suggesting that Stern argued that his right to procreate
gave him a right to custody solely because he was his child's father. Rather,
Stern's argument was that he ought to be awarded custody because his
child's natural mother had freely, knowingly, and irrevocably exchanged her
parental rights for compensation.
Stern can be understood as having claimed that our culture, and its laws,
ought to recognize a particularly broad right to procreation. This right in
cludes the use of the services of a woman willing freely to bind herself by
irrevocable contract to conceive through artificial insemination in the exer
cise of her procreative rights, and to give up her parental rights to the child
67. !d. at 448, 537 A . 2d at 1 25 3 .
68. !d. a t 4 47, 5 3 7 A . 2d a t 1 25 3 . The court's remark leaves a great deal unclear. I t could have
been intended either: ( I) as a rejection of a privacy right that would protect the use of a surrogate
as well as the exclusive parental and child custody provisions of the surrogacy agreement; or
(2) only as a rejection of the privacy right that would protect the exclusive parental and child
custody provisions of the agreement.
69. !d. at 448-49, 537 A.2d at 1 254.
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so conceived. Essentially, Stern claimed that-insofar as they oppose state
enforced surrogacy-New Jersey state law and policy unconstitutionally re
strained his procreative freedom.
The supreme court's state law emphasis, combined with its misinterpreta
tion of Stem's argument as a contradiction, enabled it to avoid directly con
fronting several important implications of the exercise and alienation of
constitutional privacy rights. These ideas, which I will pursue below in Parts
II and III, are, first, that the Whitehead-Stem contract was the free exercise
of constitutionally protected, procreative privacy rights by a childless man or
couple; second, that the contract purporting to alienate Whitehead's parental
rights was a free exercise of her procreative privacy rights; and finally, that
the Whitehead-Stern contract was a mutual exercise of Mr. Stem's and Mrs.
Whitehead's procreative and parental privacy rights. The state supreme
court impliedly rejected these ideas, without explanation.
Holding that commercial and irrevocable surrogacy agreements are
invalid, the court established that current New Jersey policy and statutes
limit the alienability of procreative and parental rights. But Baby M did not
carefully reconcile existing New Jersey limitations on alienability with the
constitutional claims of men and women who want to participate in surro
gacy arrangements. Nor did it foretell the extent to which future surrogacy
legislation, liberalizing revocability and commercialization restrictions in
New Jersey, would be subject to constitutional challenge by parties claiming
relief from contract enforcement.
Taking its opinion as a whole, it is easy to account for the court's choice to
avoid unnecessary, deep confrontation with the jurisprudence of constitu
tional privacy rights. In the first place, the court doubted that Whitehead
entered the contract freely and with full information. Economic pressure
may have made her agreement less than free.70 Lack of knowledge about her
eventual attachment to the child made her choice inadequately informed.7 1
In addition, the court clearly viewed itself as reasserting its traditional inter
est in promoting child welfare and the family. 72 Finally, the court suggested
that a specifi c performance remedy for breach of a surrogacy contract could
excessively restrain liberty and violate the thirteenth amendment. 73
The court noted briefly that Mary Beth Whitehead's constitutional privacy
rights may have included maternal rights of companionship in addition to
her basic procreative privacy rights. 74 The court seemed to imply that these
rights, like her procreative rights, gave her valid custody claims necessarily
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

!d. at 440, 5 37 A.2d at 1 249.
at 437, 5 37 A . 2d at 1 248.
!d.
!d. at 450-5 1 , 5 37 A .2d at 1 25 5 .
! d. Is this a facile multiplication o f privacy rights? I think not. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405
!d.
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i n competition with those o f Stern. The court declined t o explore White
head's companionship rights on the grounds that state law and policy, ad
vancing compelling state interests, independently established them.
3. Equal Protection
In two short paragraphs, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected Judge
Sorkow's equal protection argument which had maintained that New Jersey
must permit access to surrogacy services because state law already permits
access to sperm donation.75 To do otherwise, the trial court had argued,
wrongfully discriminates against infertile females or female-infertile couples
who wish to have children.7 6 Recognizing that the equal protection clause
imposes upon the states an obligation to treat like cases alike, the supreme
court simply denied that utilization of a sperm bank by a male-infertile
couple is relevantly similar to utilization of a surrogate by a female-infertile
couple:
I t is quite obvious that the situations are not parallel. A sperm donor sim
ply cannot be equated with a surrogate mother. The State has more than a
sufficient basis to distinguish the two situations . . . so as to justify automat
ically divesting the sperm donor of his parental rights without automati
cally divesting a surrogate mother. 77

The court went on to suggest that such an equal protection analogy would be
more appropriate in another situation made possible by new reproductive
technologies: the contribution of a fertilized or unfertilized egg for implanta
tion in another's uterus, which entails no long-term gestational services. 7 8
II.

W HOSE P R IVACY?

Stepping back from the Baby M case, I would like to assess the doubtful
proposition that the constitutional privacy rights of childless men or couples
require state validation and enforcement of surrogacy agreements. My aims
are to expose why this proposition is unpersuasive and to trace the implica
tions of some alternative attributions of privacy rights.
A . FOUR MODELS FOR PRIVACY-RIGHT ATTRIBUTION

An adequate general jurisprudence of surrogacy ideally would require that
any judicial attribution of privacy rights in connection with surrogatP. parentU.S. 645, 65 1 (referring to parental interest in the ·•companionship, care, custody, and management
of his or her children").
75. Baby M. 11, 1 09 N .J . at 449-50, 5 3 7 A.2d at 1 2 54-55.
76. Baby M, I. 2 1 7 N . J. Super at 3 87-88, 525 A.2d at 1 1 65.
7 7 . Baby M. II. 1 09 N . J. at 450, 537 A.2d at 1 254.
78. !d.
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ing b e nonarbitrary and unambiguous. A t least four models o f privacy-right
attribution present themselves.79 The procreative or family privacy at issue
in a surrogacy case can be viewed as belonging to either: ( 1 ) the childless
couple; (2) the biological father; (3) the contractual couple consisting of the
surrogate and biological father; or (4) the surrogate mother.
Judge Sorkow acknowledged only one such model in the Baby M trial.
Sorkow's constitutional privacy analysis attributed privacy protections only
to the childless couple. Because he stated no reason for choosing to carry. out
the privacy analysis from the point of view of ( 1 ) rather than (2), (3), or (4),
Sorkow's focus on the privacy of the childless couple is unambiguous, but
arbitrary.
In another noted surrogacy case, Doe v. Kelley, 80 the core problem was
ambiguity rather than arbitrariness. There, a married couple, a prospective
surrogate mother, and other anonymous parties sought a declaratory judg
ment against the state attorney general and local county prosecutor affirming
their claim that Michigan statutes prohibiting "the exchange of money or
other consideration in connection with adoption and related proceedings . . .
impermissibly infringe upon their constitutional right to privacy."8 1 Plain
tiffs John and Mary Doe planned to enter a commercial surrogate-parenting
agreement with John Doe's secretary, Mary Roe. Under the terms of the
contemplated agreement, the Does would have promised to pay Mary Roe
$5,000, over and above medical and employment benefits, to terminate pa
rental rights to a child born as a consequence of artificial insemination with
the sperm of John Doe. The court denied the requested declaration. Instead,
it held that "[w]hile the decision to bear or beget a child [is] a fundamental
interest protected by the right of privacy, . . . we do not view this right as a
valid prohibition to state interference in the plaintiffs' contractual
arrangement. "8 2
The terse opinion in Doe v. Kelley was ambiguous inasmuch as it did not
indicate whose privacy right to "bear or beget" it was referring to. The opin
ion identifi e d the plaintiffs-including both the Does and Mary Roe-as as79. I leave open the possibility that there are other models of attribution.
80. 106 M ich. App. 1 69, 1 7 3-74, 307 N.W. 2d 438, 44 1 ( 1 9 8 1 ).
8 1 . !d. at 1 70, 1 72, 307 N. W.2d at 439-40.
82. !d. at 1 73 , 307 N.W. 2d at 44 1 . The Michigan appeals court declined to uphold commercial
surrogacy, but sanctioned good samaritan surrogacy, when it concluded that, although the adoption
statute made it impossible to alter the legal status of the child, the statute did "not directly prohibit
John Doe and Mary Roe from having the child as planned." !d. However, as observed by com
mentators and, five years later, by a New York court: "The net effect of the decision prohibits the
use of surrogate mothers in the State of Michigan since few women other than perhaps a close
family member would bear someone else's child without compensation." In re Baby Girl L.J., 1 3 2
Misc.2d 9 7 2 , 976, 5 0 5 N.Y.S.2d 8 1 3, 8 1 6 (Sur. 1986).
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serting a constitutional right o f procreative privacy, and acknowledged their
fundamental right to "bear or beget. "
Adding t o the ambiguity, the court further stated that John Doe and Mary
Roe were not directly precluded by the payment prohibition from having the
child as planned. 83 This remark could mean that the constitutional procrea
tive privacy of John Doe and Mary Roe, rather than that of the Doe couple
(or the entire plaintiff group), was centrally at issue. Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court has upheld procreative privacy rights for individuals,
whatever their marital status, as well as for married couples. 84 If the prece
dent supports any surrogacy claim at all, there is no reason to believe it sup
ports only a claim brought by married persons.
If the New Jersey experience is any indicator, courts are likely to view
Solomonic decisions about child custody and the protection of the biological
family as their special burden in surrogacy cases. Still, courts that deem pri
vacy rights relevant must decide whether to assign such rights by reference
to: 1 ) the motives for procreation, entailing recognition of the sperm donor
and any mate as the bearers of relevant privacy rights; 2) the burdens and
rights of pregnancy, entailing recognition of the surrogate as the bearer of
relevant privacy rights; 3) the fact of procreation, entailing that the contrac
tual couple is the bearer of relevant privacy rights.
1 . The Childless Couple
Sorkow's one-sided privacy commentary was doubtlessly prompted by
constitutional privacy arguments the Sterns raised on their own behalf. 8 5
Accordingly, the trial court appears to have set out with the narrow objective
of tracing the implications of the constitutional privacy rights of married
persons such as the Sterns. The court gave no consideration to the possibility
that privacy rights might be attributed to the surrogate or shared between the
surrogate and the biological father.
Sorkow's married couple oriented privacy argument was weakly defended
by appeal to factually inapposite United States Supreme Court family and
procreative privacy cases. Most strained was his appeal to the abortion
rights case, R oe v. Wade. 86 His argument proceeded as a long leap from the
premise that pregnant women have a right to obtain a medical abortion to
terminate fetal life to the conclusion that infertile or medically at-risk women
83. 1 06 Mich. App. at 1 73-74, 307 N.W.2d at 44 1 .
84. Eisenstadt v . Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 ( 1 972) (statute denying unmarried persons access
to contraceptives violates equal protection and right to privacy).
85. Judge Sorkow noted that " [t)he proponents of this surrogate-parenting agreement argue that
their right to enter such a contract is protected by a fundamental right to procreate. This right of
procreation is bottomed on an individual's constitutional right of privacy. " Baby M, I, 2 1 7 N.J.
Super. at 3 84-8 5 , 525 A.2d at 1 1 63-64.
86. 4 1 0 U.S. 1 1 3 ( 1 973).
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and their spouses have a right to employ a third party to create a life. 87 This
is far from straightforward analogical or deductive legal reasoning. Sorkow
could have relied on R oe v. Wade more persuasively to argue that fertile
women have a right of procreative privacy entitling them not only to abort,
but also to create new life for reasons and purposes of their own, including
surrogate motherhood.
Several important Supreme Court reproductive rights cases have been
brought by or against professionals and entities providing procreative serv
ices. The Planned Parenthood cases88 and the recent Thornburgh v. A meri
can College of Obstetricians 89 case make plain that the Court views personal
procreative privacy rights as extending a mantle of immunity from state in
terference around certain professionals and entities selected by married
couples or individuals to provide services. In this vein, one might view the
personal privacy right at stake in Baby M as having belonged to the Stern
couple or to Mr. Stern, with only derivative privacy protection extending to
Mary Beth Whitehead and others "used" to facilitate noncoital procreation.
2. The Biological Father
A derivative privacy rights theory in the surrogacy context can be seen in
operation in a recent Kentucky case which stressed the primacy of the bio
logical father's privacy. Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Ken tucky ex
ref. A rmstrong, 90 an action commenced in 1 9 8 1 by the Kentucky Attorney
General to revoke a corporate charter, alleged that Surrogate Parenting As
sociates, Inc. (SPA) violated state adoption laws. 9 1 The trial court dismissed
the complaint, holding that facilitation of surrogacy agreements between in
fertile couples and fertile women was not an illegal breach of corporate pow
ers. An appeals court reversed, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed
87. The judge asserted: "If the law of our land sanctions a means to end life then that same law
may be used to create and celebrate life. . . . A woman and her husband have the right to procreate
and rear a family." Baby M, I, 2 1 7 N.J. Super. at 3 8 6, 525 A.2d at 1 6 64. The same argument has
been made and criticized elsewhere. See Smith & Iraola, supra note 8, at 284 & n. 1 27 ("it has been
suggested by some commentators that since a woman has a right to terminate her pregnancy and to
use contraceptives, a posteriori, the conduct required to bring about those procreative choices must
also be protected").
88. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v . Danforth, 428 U.S. 5 2 ( 1 976); Griswold v. Connecticut,
3 8 1 U.S. 4 79 (I 965).
89. 476 U.S 747 ( 1 986).
90. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1 986).
9 1 . !d. at 2 1 0. According to the state attorney general, the firm violated two statutes prohibiting
the "sale, purchase or procurement for sale or purchase of 'any child for the purpose of adoption';
. [the] filing for voluntary termination of parental rights 'prior to five (5) days after the birth of a
child." In addition, SPA was accused of violating a third statute, which specified that '"consent for
adoption' shall not 'be held valid if such consent for adoption is given prior to the fifth day after the
birth of the child . ·
ld.
"
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the court of appeals' reversal. 92
Citing Carey v. Population Services, 93 Judge Leibson, writing for the state
supreme court, invoked the constitutional right of privacy to buttress his
proposition that men, no less than women, should be permitted to rely on
technology and the voluntary assistance of third-party surrogates for infertile
or disabled spouses.94 The court stated that "we recognize ' [t]he decision
whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart . . . of constitution
ally protected choices.' "95 This right to decisional privacy of men who desire
biologically-related children, the court argued, prohibits barriers to the
"tampering with nature" necessitated when a man is "unable to conceive [a
child] in the customary manner. "9 6
The court's argument plainly was structured to derive part of its force
from the unfairness of a system that would leave women with infertile
spouses free to obtain artificial insemination through sperm banks, but would
not permit men with infertile spouses to obtain the assistance of artificially
inseminated surrogates. Essentially this same point appeared in Baby M
styled as a constitutional equal protection argument.97 The important point
here is that the court's "men's privacy" analysis was the basis for its argu
ment against termination of SPA's right to operate as a provider of surrogacy
services. SPA impliedly was accorded constitutional privacy protection de
rived from the primary constitutional privacy of married men. Presumably,
here too, the surrogate's privacy rights would be only derivative.
3. The Contractual Couple
Judge Sorkow did not take seriously the possibility of ascribing rights of
private procreative decisionmaking to the contractual couple rather than the
92. The Kentucky Supreme Court reasoned that the state statute and policy against the "buying
and selling of children" were not violated because "in the surrogate parenting procedure . . . the
agreement to bear the child is entered into before conception." !d. at 2 1 1 . Furthermore, the court
reasoned that the two statutes pertaining to voluntary termination of parental rights prior to five
days after the birth were not violated because SPA "has freely acknowledged that the initial con
tractual arrangements regarding the mother's surrender of custody and termination of parental
rights are voidable." !d. at 2 1 2 . That is, the state statutes are overriding. Consequently, irrespec
tive of the terms of the contract between the surrogate mother and the biological father, the mother
is acknowledged to have a statutory right, which she may not contractually waive, to change her
mind at any time within five days of the birth of her child. As explained by the court, "(t]he
surrogate mother's consent given before five days following the birth of the baby is no more legally
binding than the decision of an unwed mother during her pregnancy that she will put her baby up
for adoption." !d. at 2 1 2- 1 3 .
93. 43 1 U.S. 678 ( 1 977).
94. 704 S.W.2d at 2 1 2.
95. !d.
96. !d.
97. Baby M, I, 2 1 7 N .J. Super. 3 1 3, 3 87-88, 525 A.2d at 1 1 65.
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infertile married couple. 98
Surrogacy agreements are j oint ventures involving an extramarital decision
to procreate. The cultural and individual meanings attached to biological
parental ties, and the impetus to create them, contribute plausibility to the
"right to procreative privacy" arguments. It is not self-evident that a con
tractual couple, primarily bound by written agreement, should not be
deemed to exercise the same procreative privacy rights that married couples
exercise under the protective mantle of their wedding vows. Simply by virtue
of the biological ties they seek to forge, both parties share cognizable privacy
interests in the decision to have a child and in that child's fate. 99
It may be appealing in the abstract to focus on the contractual couple as a
distinct unit to which our political morality attributes privacy. Such attribu
tion, however, could be expected to have limited appeal to participants in
practice. The contractual couple model of ascribing privacy rights works less
well than the others to shield all the spouses (or other intimate partners in
volved) from feelings of guilt, envy, and betrayal that normally accompany
extramarital pregnancies. These severe feelings, which might otherwise
thwart persons from seriously considering providing or purchasing surrogacy
services, can be lessened by premising the validity of surrogacy contracts on
the marital couple's privacy or commercial rights.
In contrast to Judge Sorkow, the New Jersey Supreme Court chose to fo
cus on the contractual couple's procreative privacy rights. It therefore re
jected Mr. Stern's argument that his procreative rights demanded victory for
him, arguing that Mrs. Whitehead, as Melissa's mother, possessed identical
procreative rights.

98. The judge quickly dismissed this possibility during his rejection of visitation rights for the
maternal grandparents. "Mrs. Whitehead and Mr. Stern," he stated simply, "were never a family
unit." !d. at 404, 525 A.2d at 1 1 73.
99. I ronically, if surrogacy agreements are legal because they are considered marital procreative
agreements instead of commercial deals, policy makers may be deprived of reasons to insist on the
state's enforcement. Most of the agreements and undertakings of family life are not backed by the
enforcement powers of the state. A wife owes her husband no contract damages if she makes a
unilateral decision to abort. No injunction will issue against her to conceive, to abort, or not to
abort. She will not be compelled to keep her word. Even the marriage commitment itself can be
broken and a divorce obtained (nowadays, more or less unilaterally and on a no-fault basis). I t is
not plain why an agreement to provide a stranger the exclusive companionship of one's child should
be specifically enforceable after a change of heart when an agreement to provide a person with the
exclusive companionship of oneself as spouse is not. These facts of social life and family law may
count against construing entry into surrogacy agreements as constitutionally protected private con
duct giving rise to enforceable legal contracts. It may point toward viewing the promises that a
woman makes to a man to carry and surrender a child as unenforceable personal plans or vows. See
Jackson, Baby M and the Question of Parenthood, 76 GEO. L.J. 1 8 1 1 , 1 8 1 8 ( 1 988) (viewing such
promises as statements of "prebirth intention to renounce parental interests").

i
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4 . The Surrogate
Assuming that the constitutional right of privacy has a justifi c atory role to
play in the surrogacy context, is the best argument the "women' s privacy"
argument? The "women's privacy" argument asserts that whether a wo
man's motivation is to have her own child or to enter and fulfill the terms of
a lucrative contract, she should be free from state interference with her
choice to seek artificial insemination.
To be sure, the "men's privacy" and "childless couple privacy" arguments,
premised as they are on the desire to enjoy nuclear family life, pull at our
heartstrings. The "women's privacy" argument is without comparable senti
mental appeal. Moreover, the "women's privacy" argument ostensibly relies
upon the principle that economically motivated choices respecting a wo
man's body necessarily fall within the domain of constitutionally protected
private choice. Widespread regulation and prohibition of commercial uses of
the body, such as prostitution, render this principle doubtful. The United
States Supreme Court has held that constitutional privacy does not include
an absolute right to control one's own body. 1 00
Yet, viewing the surrogate mother as having only derivative rights to enter
surrogacy agreements seems curiously artificial. Indeed, it appears necessary
to strain to view a woman who conceives, gestates, and gives birth to a child
as having only derivative privacy interests in freedom from state interference.
After all, she alone has the right to decide whether to become pregnant and,
under R oe v. Wade, she alone has the right to decide whether to obtain a
medical abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy. 1 01
From this vantage point it seems that the surrogate's privacy right, far
from being derivative in character, surely must be primary. The surrogate
mother is more than an instrument of others' procreative liberty; indeed, she
is more than a "surrogate. " Surrogate motherhood is an exercise of procrea
tive liberty. The entire surrogacy arrangement is possible only because of the
surrogate's capacity, willingness, and liberty.
In response, one could argue that the commercial character of the surro
gate mother's aims and motives necessarily takes her outside the realm of
constitutionally protected privacy. And, since the sperm donor and his mate
desire to add a biologically related child to their family, the surrogacy trans
action is very much in the realm of their constitutionally protected privacy.
Initially, this perspective may appear to be supported by an analogy to
female prostitution. The commercial nature of prostitution is often cited as
the reason for its regulation and even criminalization. However, since a wo
man who is artificially inseminated is not a vendor of sexual arousal, there is
1 00. Roe v . Wade, 4 1 0 U.S. 1 1 3 , 1 53 ( 1 973) (woman's right to abortion not absolute).
1 0 1 . !d. at 1 64.
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no reason to view her as a prostitute. Still, some may be persuaded by the
general argument that constitutional privacy protections cannot be applied,
except derivatively, on behalf of a party whose principal motivation is mone
tary gain, whether in relation to sex or procreation. This would mean that
the sperm donor or couple, whose aim is to beget a biologically related child,
can claim privacy rights against state interference, but the profit-seeking sur
rogate mother cannot, except perhaps derivatively.
It is orthodoxy, however, that neither the prostitute nor her plient can
claim constitutional privacy rights to be free from state interference. Their
sexual relationship is characterized as commercial rather than personal or
familial, and thus as not warranting the special protection of fuhdamental
rights. In the case of the prostitute-client relationship, her lack of constitu
tionally protected privacy rights results in her clients' lack of such rights,
even though a prostitute's clients subjectively may regard their encounters as
personal, recreational sex.
This analogy to prostitution forces us, willy-nilly, to conclude that the
sperm donor equally lacks legitimate claims to constitutional privacy. Trac
ing the analogy, one must conclude that because conception, gestation, and
delivery are commercial services for the surrogate mother, the fact that the
biological father views the transaction as begetting a child is irrelevant. Be
cause money changes hands, neither sperm donor nor surrogate may claim
constitutional privacy protection against state interference.
B. THE NEED FOR CAREFUL ATTRIB UTION

Where do these reflections leave us? Doe v . Kelley called upon constitu
tional privacy rights to limit state interference with good samaritan surro
gacy, but did not indicate precisely whose privacy right does the limiting. 1 02
The court had no practical reason to dispel the troubling ambiguity, since it
did not need to specify whose privacy rights limit state action to resolve the
dispute between the adverse government and private parties to the litigation.
The government defendant's interest was in having state adoption laws held
applicable to surrogacy transactions. Its sole concern was that no plaintiff 's
privacy right be declared an obstacle to extending the adoption statutes. The
private plaintiffs' interest was in having the constitutional privacy of some
plaintiff declared an obstacle. To them, it made no practical difference
whether the privacy rights of Mary Roe alone, Doe alone, the Doe couple
alone, or the Roe-Doe couple imposed the limitation they sought to establish.
In other cases, however, courts will have good cause unambiguously and
nonarbitrarily to pronounce whose privacy rights risk abridgement. One1 02. 1 06 Mich. App. 1 69, 1 73-74, 307 N.W.2d 438, 44 1 ( 1 98 1 ); see supra text accompanying
notes 80-82.
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sided and ambiguous ascription o f privacy rights i n the surrogacy context
can mask the competing privacy interests which weaken a party's claim to be
the rightful victor in a dispute. Courts relying upon privacy arguments must
seek to acknowledge all the privacy claims, dispel all the ambiguity about
who is asserting them, and then decide which claims to legitimate. This is
especially important where, as in the Baby M case, a custody dispute arises
between a surrogate mother and biological father, both of whom claim that
their constitutional privacy rights-whether to procreative privacy or to the
companionship of the child-entitle them to prevail.
Paying careful attention to privacy right attribution can expose the weak
ness in claims that particular parties are entitled to prevail in custody dis
putes. This is not to say that custody disputes in surrogacy cases can be
resolved by simple attributions of privacy. Privacy in the constitutional
sense suggests freedom from state interference. But the concept of privacy
provides no neat adjudicative principle for resolving natural parents' child
custody disputes. Even the concept of family privacy points toward no reso
lution, since it would beg important questions to select the childless couple
rather than the surrogate and child as the relevant family whose privacy
ought to be protected. Both sides seek public assistance to secure variously
styled claims of privacy.
It is no wonder, then, that the New Jersey courts in Baby M sought refuge
in the maxim of the child's best interests and other traditional standards.
This approach to the resolution of custody disputes in surrogacy cases is very
appealing and probably best where lawful or unlawful surrogacy agreements
have gone awry. But courts need to be clear about their grounds for embrac
ing or rejecting privacy-based claims to child custody and the enforcement of
surrogacy agreements.
Ill. T H E

A PPEAL TO P RIVACY:

S O M E LIMITATIONS

It is time to consider the important matter of the contractual alienability of
fundamental constitutional privacy rights. I do not intend to repeat the ef
forts of others who have analyzed surrogacy agreements in detail from the
point of view of contract law 103 and inalienable rights. 1 04 I only want to
highlight some respects in which alienability issues are a problem for consti
tutional privacy arguments for and against commercial surrogacy.

1 03 . See Martin, Surrogate Motherhood: Con tractual Issues and Remedies Under Legislative Pro
posals, 2 3 WASHBURN L.J. 601 ( 1 984) (focusing on surrogacy and Kansas contract law).
1 04. See Radin, supra note 1 5, at 1 928-36 (surrogacy and alienability); Note, R umplestiltskin
Revisited, supra note 8 (same).
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A . I S A PROMISE A CONTRACT?

As explained in Parts I and II, a father's privacy claim against his child's
natural but "surrogate" mother is plausible on one condition: if he assumes
that she too has constitutional procreative and parental privacy rights and
that in exercise of her privacy rights, she may commercially alienate, waive
or otherwise abrogate the legal protection her privacy rights would normally
afford. The father's argument must be that surrogates exercise their parental
privacy rights by voluntarily promising to terminate parental rights in the
children they are hired to carry. Out of respect for her right to exercise her
privacy rights, her freedom of contract, and the father's equal rights and
freedom, the surrogate's agreement to terminate parental rights should be
validated and specifically enforced. So says the disappointed father.
The basic argument of disappointed fathers is that "a-promise-is-a-con
tract" : intending to give up her parental rights and be bound by her word,
the breaching surrogate mother freely made a promise to others who hired
her in the exercise of their constitutional privacy rights. The surrogate en
tered a contract. The contracting parties did not intend the key parental
rights termination provisions to be revocable at will. In fairness, the surro
gate is not to be permitted unilaterally to go back on her word by keeping the
child. Why? Because she freely and knowingly promised; because she
formed a contract; and because a court which refused to specifically enforce
the contract in the face of her breach would abridge the constitutional pro
creative privacy rights of the childless party or parties.
"A-promise-is-a-contract" arguments in the context of surrogacy disputes
attempt to marry the nineteenth-century will theory of contract 1 0 5 to the pri
vacy jurisprudence of Griswold v. Con necticut. 1 06 This marriage could be ex
pected to fail-for the former is an ailing geezer, the latter a winsome, but
unformed ingenue. A court persuaded by so tenuous a union would force the
surrogate to do what she once freely agreed to do for a childless couple that
bought her services (the argument goes) in free exercise of its privacy rights
and hers.
This potential use of the coercive power of government is cause for con
cern. Issues of contract enforceability and justice pose complexities even
apart from questions of alienability. First, not all voluntary promises and
written agreements are ipso facto legally enforceable contracts. Granted,
business contracts are widely regulated and enforced. However, the mere
105. "Will Theory" denotes the theory of contractual obligation and enforcement according to
which voluntary agreements between rational persons ought to be enforced as expressions of a free
will's intent to bind i tself. See generally P.S. ATJYAH, PROMISES, MORALS AND LAW 1 7-28 ( 1 98 1 )
(explicating and criticizing will theory); Fridman, On the Nature of Con tract, 1 7 VAL. U.L. REV.
627-54 ( 1 983) (defending version of will theory); C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE ( 1 9 8 1 ) (same).
1 06. 3 8 1 U.S. 479 ( 1 965).
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fact that money is paid out and businesses have been set up to facilitate sur
rogacy cannot be dispositive of whether surrogacy agreements should be en
forced; at least not without begging important questions. Some reason must
be given for treating surrogacy agreements as enforceable market instru
ments between commercial players ratPer than unenforceable personal com
mitments or family plans. Neither moral nor positive justice appears to
require state enforcement of every serious promise. 1 07 Indeed, one of the
most significant promises, the promise to marry, is freely revocable and
largely unenforceable under present law.
Not even the most ardent contemporary will theorists maintain that courts
should always hold a person to her word, whatever the consequences for
herself and others, simply because she knowingly and freely chose to bind
herself. Of course, a contract can legally bind us now to do what we will not
want to do later. But contracts are not sacred. They can be contrary to law
and good public policy. 10 8 Hence, arguments that the rights and interests of
others, and the surrogate's own inalienable rights and interests, pose limita
tions on contract enforcement merit a concerned ear. Quite possibly, to force
a woman to give up a child because she freely agreed to give it up prior to its
birth is to bind her to her previously exercised free choice in the least appro
priate of all contexts.
Moreover, this compulsion protects the private choice of the biological fa
ther at the expense of the reconsidered private choice of the surrogate
mother. Perhaps this is as it should be; perhaps it is entirely fitting that the
burden of temporal shifts in her preferences should be borne by the surro
gate. In connection with his analysis of autonomy as the moral basis of con
stitutional privacy, philosopher Joel Feinberg has defended the widespread
belief that earlier voluntary decisions ought normally to take precedence over
later conflicting ones. 109 Feinberg has admitted, however, that an exception
might be appropriate in rare instances in which a person undergoes a funda
mental change of character that makes her a morally different self. 1 10 In
these instances the free and voluntary choices of the "earlier self" ought not
bind the "later self. " Rejecting arguments suggesting that such metamor
phoses are commonplace, Feinberg insisted that "[t]alk of the 'earlier self '
and the 'later self' is only useful facon de parler . . . . All of our ordinary
notions of responsibility, as well as such basic moral practices as promise1 07. Why not? See generally M. BAYLES, PRINCIPLES OF LAW: A NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 1 7092 ( 1 987) (normative analysis of common law).
1 08. See id. at 1 86 ("The principle of collective good supports not using the law to enforce con
tracts contrary to laws and policies promoting or protecting collective goods.")
1 09 . Feinberg, supra note I I , at 479. But see THE MULTIPLE SELF (J. Elster ed. 1986) (empiri
cal and theoretical studies casting doubt on ordinary assumptions of human autonomy, rationality,
consistency and the unity of self).
1 1 0. Feinberg, supra note I I , at 479.
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making, presuppose a relation of personal identity between earlier and later
stages of the same self. " 1 1 1 Feinberg may have been correct about "our"
ordinary notions and moral practices. He may have been justified in offering
then: up as a benchmark in normative reasoning about hard cases. However,
the root issue raised by concern over the enforceability of surrogacy agree
ments is not temporal shifts in preference but the logically prior one of
whether persons should have the moral or legal power to make binding irrev
ocable surrogacy agreements in the first place.
Feinberg's discussion of fictional and hypothetical cases in which auton
omy is voluntarily alienated carries implications for the root issue. 1 1 2 His
discussion can be read as an argument for a liberal, anti-paternalistic pre
sumption of validity for all voluntary agreements. But such a presumption
settles nothing about the surrogate who changes her mind. Feinberg himself
stressed that no person can be obligated by voluntary agreement to act con
trary to her moral obligations and responsibilities to third parties. 1 1 3 More
over, Feinberg suggested in passing that morality may sometimes require
that the wretched individual who suffers greatly from the consequences of
her voluntary agreements be released by her obligor, as a merciful act of
humanity. 1 14
Thus, crucial for the case of the surrogate who undergoes a change of
heart is whether the surrogacy agreement violates the surrogate's obligation
and responsibilities to third parties, such as to her child or to her community.
And, if there is more to legal justice than a rights and obligations analysis of
bilateral agreements can yield alone, the man who has a child by a recalci
trant surrogate should perhaps be denied the benefit of legal enforcement, for
the sake of mercy or another virtue. Without legal enforcement of contract
provisions that prenatally terminate a surrogate's parental rights, natural
mothers are mercifully spared the emotional agony of unwanted lost access
to their children.
But where in the surrogacy debate is the burden of persuasion? Relying on
the fact that private parties have documented their agreement in a writing
styled as a legally binding contract, should courts presume prima facie legal
effect? Or should courts instead expect those who would enforce surrogacy
agreements to shoulder the onus of providing an affirmative rationale for do
ing so, acceptable to fair-minded skeptics?
How one responds to these questions may reflect one's theory about the
1 1 1 . Id.
1 1 2. !d. at 464- 8 3 .
1 1 3 . Id. a t 47 5 .
1 1 4. !d. a t 482-83 ("to let the loser [who has gambled irrevocably with h i s own future in some
way] sleep in his own bed or stew in his own juices-may be inhumane to such a degree that it
cannot rightly be done").
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origins of contractual obligation. Proponents of the view that freely entered
private promises are the principal moral basis of contract law may be in
clined to place the burden of persuasion on surrogacy's opponents. Indeed,
this conception of where the burden lies is consistent with the conclusion
that surrogacy contracts are the invalid products of economic duress rather
than free will.
The role of individual free will in the formation of legal obligation in mod
ern life is easily exaggerated. 1 1 5 In a related vein, contract theorist P.S.
Atiyah has argued that the will of a private individual cannot create a moral
or legal obligation, except to the extent allowed by background entitlements
prescribed by the social group. 1 1 6 Viewed in this light, the burden o f persua
sion may fall on surrogacy's proponents no less than on its detractors. With
out the reqUisite background entitlements, "a-promise-is-a-contract"
arguments, which stress the metaphors that minds met and free wills bound
themselves in the exercise of privacy rights, carry no particular weight.
Against this, one might respond that, as evidenced by existing moral convic
tion and legal practice, "our" social group in fact prefers earlier autonomous
choices to subsequent, contradictory ones. The resulting debate takes the
question of whether a natural father is entitled to specifically enforce the
surrogacy contract against a natural (surrogate) mother, and turns it into an
empirical and interpretive inquiry.
B. INALIENABLE RIGHTS
Women have constitutional privacy rights protecting their interests in
abortion and bearing and rearing children. It is necessary to consider
whether justice permits alienation, especially commercial alienation, of some
1 1 5 . See Dawson, Economic Duress, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 262-67 ( 1 947) (excessive emphasis
on "the will" confused the undue influence doctrine).
1 1 6. See generally P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS AND LAW ( 1 98 1 ) . There is much i n this
book with which to disagree, starting with Atiyah's moral relativism and conventionalism.
Not only a positivist like Atiyah might suppose that individuals cannot create moral or legal
obligations wholly on their own. A "natural law" theorist, for whom background rights are not
conventional, could make a parallel argument that morality, and not the bare will of individuals, is
the ultimate basis of contract law.
Are the express promises of Mrs. Whitehead of no legal import? According to Atiyah the role of
explicit promises, such as those Mrs. Whithead made to Mr. Stern, are to provide evidence of
doubtful issues that bear on contractual obligation and to serve as admissions of her felt obligation.
Jd. at 1 84-95 .
O n the most abstract level, Atiyah could b e expected t o view the Baby M courts a s having had t o
rely on what H . L.A. Hart called "rules o f obligation" and "rules o f recognition" t o decide two
concrete issues: first, whether Whitehead was entitled to make an irrevocable prenatal promise to
give up a child, and, second, whether Stern was entitled to rely on Whitehead's promise. See
H . L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77- 1 07 ( 1 96 1 ) (positivist theory of what law is and how legal
obligation can be recognized).

1 9 8 8]

P RIVACY, S URROGACY, AND BAB Y M

1 7 87

of these important rights through irrevocable prenatal parental-rights termi
nation agreements.
The issue of the alienability of constitutional rights arose indirectly or not
at all in the Baby M opinions. Chief Justice Wilentz did not address in gen
eral terms the power of the individual to waive the protection of constitu
tional privacy rights. However, his rulings regarding New Jersey law
entailed, in effect, the proposition that parental rights are commercially ina
lienable, but are otherwise alienable subject to a reserved right of revocation.
Judge Sorkow addressed the fundamental privacy rights alienability issue
more directly when he held that the provisions in the Whitehead-Stem surro
gacy agreement whereby Whitehead promised not to abort were void under
R oe v. Wade. Having found that the protections afforded by abortion pri
vacy rights are commercially inalienable, it is a little surprising that Sorkow
did not go a further step. Nevertheless, before concluding that surrogacy
agreements are valid and enforceable, he did not anticipate and meet the
argument that agreements promising to terminate parental rights are void as
unlawful alienation of procreative and parental privacy rights guaranteed by
the Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. 1 1 7
The surrogate who is fighting the judicial validation of a prenatal parental
rights termination agreement has a complex response to "a-promise-is-a-con
tract" arguments. This response did not explicitly appear in Baby M, but
obviously bears on the adjudication of surrogacy disputes. The argument
relies on the concept of inalienability 1 1 8 and has a strong and a weak version,
both of which may help the case of a surrogate who changes her mind during
or after pregnancy.
The strong version is that the parental rights attendant to family and pro
creative privacy rights are commercially inalienable-that is, they cannot be
exchanged for money-because they are of fundamen ta/ 1 1 9 importance to
1 1 7. My conjecture is simply that he recognized no United States Supreme Court precedent that
applied as clearly to parental rights waivers as he thought the abortion precedents applied.
1 1 8. As explained by Margaret Jane Radin, "inalienability" is a central concept in our culture
and "[y Jet there is no one sharp meaning for the term. " Radin, supra note 1 5, at 1 850. Its denota
tive meanings range from "nontransferable," to "nonsalable," to "nonrelinquishable by a
rightholder," to "incapable of being lost at all." Id. at 1 8 5 3 . In the discussion that follows, two
senses of "inalienability" are most pertinent, namely "nonreliquishable by the rightholder" and
"nonsalable." I am inclined to group myself among those who believe that parental rights should
be deemed both relinquishable and nonsalable. As Radin points out, characterizing rights as non
salable "expresses an aspiration for noncommodification." !d. at 1 85 5 n.24. The desire for noncom
modification of children is one reason for opposing all forms of profitable surrogacy. The
noncommodification of the womb is another. Yet I think it is largely unproblematic that parental
rights are deemed transferable and relinquishable under noncommercial conditions, as when a teen
ager gives up her child for adoption. Nor does it trouble me that parental rights can be lost, for
example, by virtue of serious child abuse or persistent neglect.
1 1 9. See Feinberg, supra note 1 1 , at 489 (citing Palko v . Connecticut, 302 U.S. 3 1 9 , 325 ( 1 937),
and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 4 1 3 U.S. 49, 65 ( 1 973), for proposition that only fundamental
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their possessors' best interests. 1 20 The strong version would support laws
barring the satisfaction of women's own desires lawfully to hire themselves
out as surrogates. The argument is thus paternalistic, though the paternal
ism may be virtuous. 1 2 1 For their own good (as policy makers interpret it),
o r in the interest of values that underlie their own rights (again, as policy
makers interpret them), all women are denied a liberty which some women
want.
The weak version is that a woman can commercially alienate parental
rights, but not without reserving a postnatal opportunity to change her mind.
To the extent that the aversion of childless couples to the risk of sudden
revocation will reduce demand for surrogacy and thereby diminish opportu
nities to work as surrogates, the weak version also bars the satisfaction of
women's own desires to work as surrogates. The weak version inalienability
argument also is, in a sense, paternalistic.
The strong version or weak version argument, if convincing, could be uti
lized successfully by the regretful surrogate who discovers that she would
very much like to mother a child she had previously agreed to give up. If the
weak version inalienability argument is correct, the statutory right to a post
natal period of reconsideration guaranteed by the adoption laws of New
Jersey and most other states is also a right of constitutional proportions.
Is either the strong version or weak version inalienability argument plausi
ble? Should the implicit paternalism of these arguments be troubling? To
trace an answer, it is necessary to focus on a particular normative conception
of alienability.
Diana T. Meyers has argued that inalienable rights include these four:
The right to life, the right to personal liberty, the right not to suffer gratuiliberties constitutionally protected). According to Feinberg, "it is not simply by virtue of being
primarily self-regarding that decisions involving marital sex and family planning fall within the
zone of constitutional privacy . . . . Rather, the court . . . has circumscribed as 'private' those deci
sions that involve the most basic of self-regarding decisions." Id.
1 20. The strongest inalienability argument would maintain that a woman cannot alienate her
parental rights at all-not even when she expects no monetary compensation. This would amount
to an argument even against non-commercial voluntary adoption.
1 2 1 . A paternalistic interference with liberty can be morally justified, morally unjustified, or
morally obligatory, depending upon the circumstances. By "paternalistic inter ference" I mean any
deliberate action undertaken for reasons referring to the presumed good, well-being, or better inter
est of the subject of paternalism, sometimes without his or her consent. One would be morally
justified, if not obligated, in stopping a madman from swimming in an icy lake. However, I find no
difficulty in failing to stop an experienced cold water swimmer who one knows to be sane and aware
of the risks of practicing in an icy lake.
Mary Beth Whitehead (and her former husband) brought a suit against the New York clinic that
arranged the Baby M contract, alleging that it had failed to exercise proper care i n selecting her to
serve as a surrogate. The lawsuit settled. L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, at 2, col. 3 . One way to
understand the claim that Whitehead settled is as a plea for obligatory paternalism even in the face
of an unyielding and ostensibly unflappable would-be surrogate.
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taus pain, and the right to satisfaction of basic needs such as food, water,
clothing, shelter, and medical care needed for survival. 1 22 The alienability of
modes of personal liberty most concern us here. According to Meyers, to say
that a right is inalienable is to say that it protects prerogatives essential to the
security of free and responsible moral agents. There can be no obligation to
give up or voluntarily renounce such rights. 1 23 Moreover, an inalienable
right cannot be renounced; individuals cannot "dispense with the control
over their lives which this [kind of] right would afford. " 1 24
Adapting Meyers's moral theoretic conceptions to constitutional law, we
can see why freedom of contract should not include the freedom to bargain
away certain constitutional rights. They are understood as being inalienable,
in the interest of personal security. One should not be able to contract away,
for example, the protection of vital personal liberties guaranteed by the thir
teenth and fourteenth amendments.
The recalcitrant surrogate's inalienability argument is premised on the
commercial inalienability of parental rights that are implied by a general con
stitutional right of family and procreative privacy. Parental rights plausibly
can be numbered among inalienable rights because they are a form of liberty
linked to personal security. The surrogate's strong version inalienability ar
gument is that her own constitutional privacy prevents her from entering a
valid and enforceable commercial surrogacy contract. The surrogate's weak
version inalienability argument is that her own constitutionally protected pri
vacy rights are tied to essential personal liberty in such a way that they can
not be given up. Such privacy rights are construed to include both the right
to terminate parental rights and the fullest opportunity for reflection about
terminating parental rights consistent with the inalienable rights of others. 1 2 5
Hence, the surrogate who agrees prior to conception or childbirth to termi
nate parental rights upon the birth of a child simply lacks the moral and legal
power to bind herself to such an agreement.
Obviously, this calls for a close analysis of the bases of inalienability claims
in the surrogacy context. In the wake of Griswold and Roe, the respects in
which values of personal security and liberty are at stake in a woman's deci1 22. D. MEYERS, INALI ENABLE RIGHTS 53 ( 1 985) (philosophical account of natural and inalien
able rights).
1 23 . !d. at 3 1 -34. Meyers argued that renunciation of the inalienable moral rights that make our
lives secure would render the institution of morality self-defeating. Therefore, inalienable rights
must be understood to impose obligations of self-restraint on right-holders. Holders of inalienable
rights thus lack moral powers of waiver or other voluntary renunciation. See generally Note, Rum
pelstiflskin Revisited. supra note 8, at 1 94 1 - 1 949 (assessing competing theories of inalienability and
defending rights central to personhood as inalienable).
1 24. D. MEYERS, supra note 1 22, at 1 5 .
1 25 . Those individuals who conceivably have inalienable rights that would constrain the surro
gate's right to change her mind surely include the surrogate-born child. But this assumes that there
is an inalienable right to a stable environment soon after birth.
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sion to abort have been well-articulated. Feminists have helped to provide a
vocabulary of useful phrases to convey complex conceptions of what is at
stake: free choice, self-determination, and control over one's own body. The
respects in which values of personal security and liberty are at stake in a
women's reconsidered choice to mother a child she has carried have not been
well articulated. Legal theorists are unpracticed at serious, polemical de
fenses of "natural" motherhood-the kind of defenses that do not rely upon
platitude, sentimentality, or sex-role stereotyping.
This is not to suggest that the value of mothering one's own child is more
mysterious or ineffable than other exalted human experiences. Until re
cently, "natural" motherhood needed no serious defense. 1 26 For more than a
century in the United States, it has been widely presumed that mothering
one's own child is both a right and a duty. It appears that the New Jersey
Supreme Court had its eyes on "the child's best interests" but also the rights
of natural motherhood when it chided the lower court for separating Baby M
from her natural mother during the pendency of custody litigation. 1 27
A woman's security may be tied to the fate of her offspring in at least two
distinct and evident ways. First, her security can be undermined by the feel
ing that she has lost control of a vulnerable being whom she has helped cre
ate and set loose into the world. A woman may come to regard her
voluntary loss of control as a failure of responsibility and as deeply regretta
ble. Indeed, one reason the abortion right is so important to women is that
their sense of responsibility often dictates that they should not carry a child
to term unless they personally have the psychological and financial resources
to care for it. Surrogate parenting is possible only to the extent that women
are substantially free of the feelings of personal responsibility for their
children.
Second, women often identify strongly with their children. This sense of
identity can stem from awareness of the pi1ysical connection that character
izes the latter stages of pregnancy. It also can stem from knowledge of a
genetic link. By virtue of biological ties, a woman may view her child as her
link with the past, a part of her family, and her stake in the future. 1 28
Because women's security can be so tied to the fate of their offspring, there
is at least one good reason to treat parental privacy rights as commercially
inalienable. A more permissive rule, one that allowed parental rights to be
1 26. Poor and minority women have been subject to criticism from middle-class moralists who
have questioned their fitness for the role of motherhood. See L. BANNER, supra note 5 5 , at 1 03
(early efforts by black women's organization to challenge view that black women "naturally
promiscuous").
1 27. Baby M, 11, 1 09 N.J. at 466, 537 A.2d at 1 263.
1 28 . Indeed, this keen desire for biological kin is what Richard Stern said led him to seek the
help of surrogate Mary Beth Whitehead. !d. at 8.
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commercially alienated but subject to revocation as a matter of law, would
have an analogous justification. This more permissive rule would preserve
surrogacy as an option, at least nominally.
If the prenatal parental-rights termination provisions of surrogacy agree
ments are void as ineffective waivers of inalienable rights, the existence of
surrogacy agreements provides no privacy grounds for awarding a disputed
child to its biological father. Principles of estoppel and detrimental reliance
derived from the common law of contracts have no normative power in the
face of fundamental and inalienable privacy rights protecting the surrogate's
parental status. 1 29 Despite her "breach" and the father's "good faith" and
"reliance," her custody claims equal his.
Of course, whether commercial surrogacy ought to be a lawful option is an
inquiry that the analysis of privacy claims only begins to answer. Inalienabil
ity rules are justified to the extent that they discourage the creation of mone
tary incentives for women to do what their basic well-being overwhelmingly
demands that they do not do: prenatally promise, without recourse, to give
up a child they may later want very much to keep.
My proposed account of why parental rights should be treated as inaliena
ble, does not force us to conclude that women's rights to choose medically
safe abortion or sterilization should be governmentally restricted for their
own good-to give them opportunities to change their minds about mother
hood. Issues of personal security and identity do not arise as acutely and
concretely for contemporary American women choosing first trimester abor
tion or sterilization as they do for women who have actually carried and
given birth to a child. The alienability restrictions I have described for surro
gacy are motivated by the greater likelihood and severity of real and, in some
respects, unique harms risked by surrogates.
IV. CONCLUSION
Neither courts, lawyers, nor legal commentators have succeeded in persua
sively setting out a privacy case for surrogacy. Sorkow's Baby M opinion
made much of the procreative privacy of childless married men and their
spouses. It insisted that courts must respect privacy in the adjudication of
surrogacy agreements and child custody disputes. Sorkow's Baby M opinion
implied that if a would-be surrogate wants the right to change her mind and
she is not provided with such a right by statute, then she must bargain for it.
As the New Jersey Supreme Court would correctly point out, the "childless
couple" oriented, "privacy right" based contract validation and enforcement
policy urged by Judge Sorkow failed to accord equal deference to the procre129. But see Coleman, supra note 8, at 100 (surrogate agreement may work estoppel against
natural mother).
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ative and parental privacy of the surrogate. As I have pointed out here, both
opinions skirted the difficult question of the alienability of the consti
tutional privacy rights they invoked.
Baby M did not forge the needed link between privacy rights in procrea
tion and families, on the one hand, and reproductive pacts with strangers on
the other. Neither of the two Baby M courts grappled with the issues of
alienability and inalienability that cloud ready understanding of what consti
tutional privacy should require. For this reason, Baby M did not much ad
vance public understanding of whether those of us who have been unlucky in
the natural lottery should be authorized to create incentives that tempt
others to vend procreative capacities and fundamental parental rights.
Surrogacy arrangements may provide some men the only realistic means
of having a biologically related child. They may provide some women the
only realistic hope to mother a child. They may make marriages happier by
giving couples their best shot at normalcy. Private commercial surrogacy
arrangements may be necessary to create incentives for significant numbers
of women to agree to conceive and carry children that they understand they
must surrender. These facts offer bare utilitarian support for the practice of
surrogacy. But they do not plainly make it a good and just idea.

Baby M

I

